Wayne Glew, Rod Culleton, GAP, and the Privy Council

COMBO: Chapter (5) Wayne Glew Chapter (7) Rodney Culleton Chapter (14) The Great Australia Party (GAP) Chapter (31) Appealing to the UK Privy Council

Chapter (5) Wayne Glew 

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Wayne Kenneth Glew has an extensive OPCA and constitutional litigation history. In fact, the decisions made in Wayne’s cases are relied upon, whenever similar contentions are brought before courts today, and in many cases they have become precedent in the particular point of law.

Here is a brief summary of cases past: 

Glew & Anor v Shire of Greenough [2006] WASCA 260: 2

Glew & Anor v Shire of Greenough [2007] HCATrans 520: 3

Glew v The Governor of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 123: 4 [Appeal]

Glew v The Governor of Western Australia [2009] WASC 14: 5 [Trial]

Glew issued a writ of summons on 28 August 2008 directed to the Governor of Western Australia.” The Crown responds that it should be struck out. The Courts agree. The Court of Appeal provides a brief summary of Glew’s argument: (from 5)

“The appellant alleged that, on 1 January 2004, the Governor, the Attorney-General and the Parliament of Western Australia unlawfully and illegally enacted the AARCLP Act, which purported to remove the Crown and Monarch from all legislation within Western Australia, without the formal referendum consent required under s 73(2)(g) of the Constitution Act. The appellant pleaded that, by purporting to do so, the Parliament of Western Australia, with the apparent consent and agreement of the courts of the State of Western Australia and of the Commonwealth, in effect, created an illegal State and fractured the Commonwealth. The appellant pleaded that the office of Governor has been altered by the substitution of the Governor for the Monarch and Sovereign in the AARCLP Act. The appellant pleaded that the AARCLP Act ‘has created [a] breach of allegiance being treason and misprision of treason’. The appellant sought declarations that the Acts referred to were void and of no effect. He also sought an injunction, pursuant to s 73(6) of the Constitution Act, to enforce the provisions of s 73(2)(g) of that Act, and an injunction to prevent the state election scheduled for 6 September 2008.”

The appeals court is less than complementary on Glew’s materials (para. 20)

“The appellant’s written outline of submissions did not advance the matter. It consisted, without any explanation as to their relevance, of the reproduction of a number of provisions of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Crimes Act 1958, Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (Cth), and miscellaneous other legislation, extracts from Black’s Law Dictionary and, from The Bible, extracts from the books of Exodus and Zechariah, the second epistle of Paul to the Corinthians, the epistle of James and the gospel according to St Matthew.”

Glew v City of Greater Geraldton [2012] WASCA 94: 6

Glew tried the same appeal grounds that he used in [2010] WASCA 87. It still doesn’t work.

Glew v White [2012] WASCA 138 7 [upper appeal]

Glew v White [2012] WASC 100: 8 [lower appeal]

Municipal officers visited Glew’s residence as they suspected there was a fire. They had a duty to investigate under the Bush Fires Act. Glew appeared, used nasty language, and forced them back into their car. The officer’s withdrew. Glew was subsequently arrested by police for assault and interference with exercise of official duties. On appeal Glew complained that he was tried without a jury, that he didn’t consent to the proceedings, that he didn’t consent to his plea, the courts were defective for assorted constitutional reasons, and that his “no trespassing’ sign trumped state authority.

The Western Australia Court of Appeal offers some excerpts from Glew’s submissions (para. 7):

“All Acts of Parliament in Australia since 1919, with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, have not been lawfully enacted due to the fact that there have been no Orders in the Privy Council, ie: the Queen-in-Council, for the Appointments of any Vice Regal executive representatives of the Crown of the United Kingdom to grant the ‘Royal Assent’ to enact Statute Laws, which was the procedure when the Commonwealth of Australia was ‘under the Crown of the United Kingdom’ as per the Act of the UK Parliament to Constitute the Commonwealth of Australia (Victoria 63 & 64, Chapter 12, 9th July 1900) it follows that all the Appointments of Judges and Magistrates are also Fraudulent. ‘A Judge without Jurisdiction is to be disobeyed with immunity’ Australia is Democracy which literally means that the PEOPLE RULE, ie: Sovereignty lies with the People who exercise that ‘ultimate authority to make and impose laws’ by way of the unanimous Judgements of 12 Free Men empanelled as Jurors who as: ‘So Help me God’, in order that they can administer Justice. I, therefore, Challenge the Jurisdiction of the court. This Challenge can only be determined by Special Jury. I have NO CONTRACT with any person posing as a Magistrate or Judge in either the Commonwealth or the State of Australia, and I do NOT CONSENT to their having any Jurisdiction over me. I am a FREEMAN-ON-THE-LAND and NOT IN BONDAGE to any person posing as a Judge or Magistrate, nor to any corporation either in Australia or Overseas.”

The court is not impressed, and they’ve heard it all before (para. 11):

“This appeal is an abuse of process. The appellant is well aware that his idiosyncratic contentions have been repeatedly rejected in other cases. The appellant has invoked the court’s process and procedures for an illegitimate or collateral purpose, namely, as a platform for advancing his nonsensical theories. He appeared at the hearing with the support of a large retinue who appear to share or sympathise with his views. The appellant is not interested in securing justice according to law (either in relation to the convictions in question or otherwise) in accordance with the system of justice administered by the courts of this State. At the hearing on 5 July 2012 he advanced arguments in language which was often disparaging and derisory of this court and the functions it performs.”

Glew is apparently an inventor, and had “invented systems for the supply of fuel in a vaporised form into the combustion chamber of an internal combustion engine.” (para. 1). Glew may or may not have transferred title of the invention to his company, Glew Technologies Pty Ltd. Frank Jasper and his company invested i n the technology in exchange for a share of the profits. Jasper & Co. bought a license from GlewTech to sell the invention in part of the US for $1 million (para. 5). The parties became unhappy with one another, Jasper sues, and Glew argues he never gave GlewTech the invention, so Jasper’s lawsuit is moot. Jasper also says the invention is crap, and Glew lied about that.

The majority of the trial addresses two issues. First, when Glew spoke was it for GlewTech or both GlewTech and himself. The court, rather unsurprisingly, says they were one and the same. The second issue is whether the invention was misrepresented as not-crap. Yep, and over and over and over… Glew also lied about other sales and licenses in the works, such as that Toyota had offered $100 million for a license, and Mercedes wanted the technology for aircraft engines. The trial judge concludes the GlewTech corporation is essentially irrelevant, and that Glew systematically misrepresented his invention, and interest in his invention. The next step is to calculate damages, which will be heard separately.

GLEW -v- FRANK JASPER PTY LTD [2008] WASCA 186: 9

FRANK JASPER PTY LTD -v- GLEW [2009] WASC 13: 10

It also seems Glew tried to appeal a step by the trial judge for various forms of misconduct and bias, but then abandoned that appeal. The attempt by the other parties to obtain elevated costs for that appeal meets with mixed success:

GLEW -v- FRANK JASPER PTY LTD [2010] WASCA 87: 11 Glew tries to get leave to appeal to the Western Australia Court of Appeal. He alleges the trial court judge, Justice Martin, had made many errors.

  • Wayne Stuart Martin sat in criminal contempt of the High Court of Australia when he failed to meet the requirements of chapter 3 of the Australian constitution.
  • Wayne Stuart Martin represented himself as a justice of the supreme court of Western Australia when he was an employee of the corporation ‘The Department of the Attorney General’. ABN: 70598 519443.
  • Wayne Stuart Martin sat in the supreme court of Western Australia knowing that the supreme court of Western Australia did not meet the constitutional requirements of chapter 3 of the Australian constitution.
  • Wayne Stuart Martin while acting as the chief Justice of the supreme court of Western Australia refused to allow a trial by jury contrary by [sic] section 80 of the Federal constitution and the act of Habius Corpus 1640. 1 Charles chapter 10.
  • Wayne Stuart Martin refused to allow Wayne Kenneth Glew the right to represent his company ‘Glew Technologies’ and then forced ‘Glew Technologies’ and Wayne Kenneth Glew the Director of ‘Glew Technologies PTY LTD’ to stand trial without representation. And therefore committed a crime against humanity being enslavement contrary to sections 268, 10, 11 and 12 of the crimes act 1914 Federal.
  • Wayne Stuart Martin handed down the decision in the above case on the 15th of February 2010 and at the time of handing down the decision ignored key parts of the evidence presented in court and acted in fraud and total bias to Wayne Kenneth Glew and ‘Glew Technologies PTY LTD’.
  • Wayne Stuart Martin had revealed to him on the 9th of September 2009 two separate indictable offences, those being conspiracy to pervert the course of justice contrary to section 42 of the Crimes Act 1914 Federal and an attempt to pervert the course of justice contrary to section 43 of the Crimes Act 1914 Federal. Wayne Stuart Martin refused to deal with the issues revealed to him therefore making him party to the offences committed.
  • Wayne Stuart Martin refused to acknowledge the constitutional issues raised in the court on the 7th – 10th September 2009 and refused to abide by them.”

The court briefly responds to each of these issues at paras. 14-28. They amount to a mixture of spurious arguments on judicial oaths, constitutional structure, and allegations of fraud. These complaints were rejected, and the leave to appeal application was dismissed.

FRANK JASPER PTY LTD -v- GLEW [No 2] [2010] WASC 24: 12

FRANK JASPER PTY LTD -v- GLEW [No 3] [2012] WASC 24: 13

Back to the trial court. Now that Glew and his company have been found liable there is the issue of court costs. The value of the inventions is assessed – absolutely nothing (paras. 22-23). Combining the damages and court costs, Glew is assessed at over $2 million (para. 25). The supplementary decision doubles certain of the court costs. Yikes! Globally, the court concludes that the fact this proceeding was so difficult to advance and resolve is all Glew’s fault and he is going to bear the consequences of that.

GLEW -v- FRANK JASPER PTY LTD [2012] WASCA 93: 14

Glew isn’t happy with that result, and tries to appeal on basically the same basis as in [2010] WASCA 87. The court rejects the leave application for essentially the same reasons as before. Glew walked out of the proceedings, and any defect for that was his own fault.

Re Glew; ex parte the Hon Michael Mischin MLC, Attorney General (WA) [2014] WASC 107 15 

On 23 December 2011 Wayne Glew was convicted in the Geraldton Magistrates’ Court of one offence of assaulting a public officer and one offence of obstructing an officer in the execution of his duty. Glew provided legal advice to Heather Glendinning, who killed herself and her two daughters in a murder–suicide in 2011. He subsequently told The West Australian that she had been murdered, and that “I spent 17 years in the police and you can make anything look like anything”. 16

Wayne Glew has been a claimant, defendant or appellant in at least 16 Court proceedings in which he has argued against the validity of the Australian legal system. Glew has not been successful in a single proceeding to date.

This resulted in Glew being declared a vexatious litigant by the Supreme Court of Western Australia and being prevented from initiating any further Court proceedings in Western Australia.

Wayne Glew keeps a high public profile, calls himself “The Talking Bulldog”  you can find a plethora of his videos on the Internet. 17 He also regularly posts on Facebook 18

On the 22’nd of September 2014 the registered CPO’s of Western Australia filed in the High Court register Perth 1. Writ of Mandamus 2. Writ of Prohibition against the corporation of the State Government of Western Australia and Colin Barnett. WRIT OF MANDAMUS This Writ commands you to dissolve the company known as the State Government of Western Australia ABN 072526008 and remove yourself and all other so called Politicians from our Parliament. And further you are commanded to remove Wayne Stuart Martin, John McKechnie and the so called Governor of Western Australia from our Governing bodies or show cause why it has not been done. Further you are commanded to stop personating an Officer of the Crown and a lawful Government contrary to section 271 Commonwealth Criminal Code. YOU ARE REQUIRED TO make a return to this Writ by filing a notice on or before 3rd October 2014 stating whether you have done what you are commended to do by this Writ or stating why it has not been done. TAKE NOTICE that disobeying this Writ is a contempt of Court which may be punished by imprisonment, fine or both.” 19 

Wayne Glew has his property seized because he refuses to pay $300,000 owing in rates

Wayne Glew

A long-running dispute in Western Australia has ended with a ‘sovereign citizen’ having his property seized and sold from under him.

Wayne Kenneth Glew, from Geraldton, owed his council $300,000 in rates and legal costs, which he refused to pay because he believed local governments were unconstitutional. Mr Glew is one of an informal movement of ‘freemen’ or ‘sovereign citizens’, who believed Australian legislative laws only applied if you consented to them.

Mr Glew, a former police officer, has appealed a court order from the council to remove his possessions from the property. It is not the first time he has taken his fight to the court of appeal. In 2014 he was declared a “vexatious litigant” by the Supreme Court of WA, with his position being described as “nonsensical and incoherent”. Mr Glew claimed the City of Greater Geraldton could not lawfully make constituents pay rates, because local governments were not written in Australia’s constitution. Mr Glew said the city could not seize his land because he claimed it under Magna Carta. “It is not getting sold because I have it held under clause 61 of Magna Carta,” he said. “They cannot touch it, they fenced it — I threw the gates away, they put concrete blocks there — I threw them away, I blocked it. “I own it and I paid for it.”

City of Greater Geraldton Mayor Shane Van Styn said Mr Glew’s actions were an injustice to those doing the right thing by paying their yearly rates. “He has some crazy misconception that the laws do not apply to him, and regrettably we have been forced to take action to seize his property to cover costs that rightfully belong to the ratepayers of Greater Geraldton.” Mr Van Styn said seizing Mr Glew’s property was a last resort. “Everyone is required to pay the costs of living in a community,” he said. “We do not have roads and civic services out of nowhere. We require rates to run a city that functions with all the services that everyone needs from day to day. If people think they are above contributing to that under lawful direction from the state then regrettably we must take such severe action.”

Constitutional law expert Professor Anne Twomey said the council’s actions were legal. “The State of WA has the power to enact legislation that sets up a system of local government, which includes the City of Greater Geraldton and other places,” she said.  

Professor Twomey said Magna Carta was an important historic statute but had little relevance in today’s society. “You have got to understand that under British law, their constitution is the system of parliamentary sovereignty and that means parliament itself can always change its own laws,” she said. “There is very little left of Magna Carta in the United Kingdom because many later laws have overridden and changed it from time to time. The same issue arises in Australia — Magna Carta became part of Australian law as a received British law … it would have been a much cut-down version of Magna Carta. Only the little dribs and drabs that were left, and even those dribs and drabs they are not entrenched as part of our law they are just part of ordinary statute that can be changed by later statute.” 

Professor Twomey said despite what people believed, the law would prevail. “If you notice, all of these people [who] object to paying taxes or rates and everything else say that the laws are invalid,” she said. “The curious thing is I have never heard any single one of them ever complain that the law is invalid if it gives them unemployment benefits or if it gives them any advantage. Nor do you ever see them refusing to use a hospital or a school or a road because it has been paid for by other people under invalid taxes or rates. People tend to just want to take the benefits and not want to pay or contribute.” 23

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Public Notice from City of Greater Geraldton Council 23a

The endless vexatious challenges and non-payment of the rates on his land eventually caught up with Wayne Glew in August 2017, with City of Greater Geraldton taking possession of the property under section 6.64 of the Local Government Act 1995 (WA):

Actions to be taken

(1) If any rates or service charges which are due to a local government in respect of any rateable land have been unpaid for at least 3 years the local government may, in accordance with the appropriate provisions of this Subdivision take possession of the land and hold the land as against a person having an estate or interest in the land and-

(a) from time to time lease the land; or
(b) sell the land; or
(c) cause the land to be transferred to the Crown; or
(d) cause the land to be transferred to itself.

(2) On taking possession of any land under this section, the local government is to give to the owner of the land such notification as is prescribed and then to affix on a conspicuous part of the land a notice, in the form or substantially in the form prescribed.

(3) Where payment of rates or service charges imposed in respect of any land is in arrears the local government has an interest in the land in respect of which it may lodge a caveat to preclude dealings in respect of the land, and may withdraw caveats so lodged by it.” 24

Of course, Wayne Glew did not recognise their authority to do so, and has consistently denied ever since that the property has been seized by council. He started proceedings to recover items on the property, using it as a platform for his arguments, (which had already been rejected in Shoalhaven City Council v Ellis [2012] NSWLEC 225 and his own prior cases above) but after failing to submit details on items and their owners, the case was dismissed.

“Well-known litigant Wayne Glew is suing the City of Greater Geraldton in an attempt to recover personal property from the Glenfield house the City seized in lieu of unpaid rates. 25

About 30 people filled the public gallery at Geraldton Courthouse, with one man eventually ejected. Proceedings began at 2.15pm today, with more than an hour of court time taken up as Mr Glew disputed Magistrate Chris Miocevich’s authority to hear the civil case. Mr Glew cited several legal milestones including the Magna Carta and English Bill of Rights, and said he had recently lodged an appeal to the House of Lords in England. Representing himself, he also argued against the City of Greater Geraldton’s constitutional authority to tax and seize land, as it had done with his former home.

Mr Miocevich dismissed these objections after citing several legal judgments, mostly against Mr Glew who had been disputing his rates bills since 2005, and ruled that he had the authority to hear the case. He then ruled against Mr Glew’s authority to issue documents jointly on behalf of himself and his former wife, whose signature did not appear on them. “She told me on Christmas Day 2017 to do what I effing well like,” Mr Glew said. “So you honestly take that as her authority to proceed on her behalf?” the Magistrate said. 

Two witnesses were called. City of Greater Geraldton rates coordinator Sandra Lee Russell under oath agreed she had issued three affidavits and issued rates bills for $146,000 and $285,000 to Mr Glew. Mr Glew attempted to challenge her legal authority to do this, and the magistrate repeatedly reminded him he could only ask her to answer questions of fact. Mr Glew then produced a document he described as a notice of seizure under clause 61 of the Magna Carta he said he had issued to the City. The Magistrate rejected this. “There is a requirement under the Act that notices must be sent and her evidence is that the notices have been sent,” Mr Miocevich said. The rates coordinator left the court to calls of “coward” and “no b**ls” from the public gallery.

The second witness, Peter Smith, said the City had contracted him to produce an inventory of the personal belongings inside and outside the seized property in Chapman Road. He said he had attended several times, once in the company of Mr Glew’s former wife, who  placed her personal items on a verandah with the intention of returning to collect them. However Mr Smith said the City advised him not to allow her to do so unless in his company. “I wrote to her and when she did not reply I returned. The items had been thrown out into the rain, the wedding dress, the bikes, et cetera,” he said. When cross examined by Mr Glew, Mr Smith said he had not cut a padlock. “The first time I went there the padlock was cut and windows smashed,” Mr Smith said. 

Mr Miocevich then adjourned the case until 2.15pm tomorrow, giving both parties the option of calling further witnesses or simply summing up their respective cases. “I will hear evidence from both sides, I don’t expect to give a decision tomorrow,” he said.”

“Well-known Geraldton litigant Wayne Glew has been ordered to submit a list of people who own various items stored in the shed of his former home. 26

The City of Greater Geraldton seized the Glenfield property last year in lieu of unpaid rates, and Mr Glew told the court he had continued to use the shed in order to earn a living. 

Magistrate Chris Miocevich said Mr Glew had caused Council “a great deal of expense” by not disclosing that the items belonged to other people until today, and asked him to list the owners on an affidavit. “Do not order me to do an affidavit because I won’t,” Mr Glew said. “It is a legally binding document that can be later used in a court of law against me.” After conferring with City of Greater Geraldton’s lawyer Gray Porter, the magistrate agreed that a list would be acceptable. “You are to file with the court a list of names, phone numbers and addresses of the people you say have an interest in the property,” the magistrate said. “You are to advise in writing any person you claim has an interest in those properties and they must contact the City of Greater Geraldton by February 4. “If you don’t take these items the council will have to sell them.”

Today’s session began at 2.15pm, having been adjourned from the day before when Mr Glew’s legal arguments delayed the City’s attempted application for a court order to dispose of the goods. Mr Glew continued to challenge the constitutional authority of the City and the magistrate throughout today’s hearing which ran from 2.15pm to 4pm. Mr Glew claims a magistrate has no authority to preside over the case because their power came from Section 35 of the Magistrate’s Court Act WA 2004 which was “repugnant” to the Commonwealth Constitution section 75.5. The magistrate reserved his decision and adjourned the matter until February 6. Outside the courthouse Mr Glew told The Geraldton Guardian he had lodged an appeal with the House of Lords in England.”

In the minds of Wayne Glew’s followers, the case was regarding the seizure of the property, but this was never even entertained by the court, but simply the recovery of items.

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Wayne Glew continued to post via his Facebook page through early 2019 that the property is still his, that no seizure occurred, and that the outcome of the court proceedings were in his favour, because no ruling was made regarding the property. In response to this, and the constant barrage of comments from Wayne Glew’s supporters, City of Greater Geraldton Mayor Shane Van Styn 27 posted a copy of the Duplicate Land Title on his Facebook page. 28 He said:

“It sadly has been a long path (since 2003) for the ratepayers of Geraldton and not an outcome we wished to pursue, but we were left with no choice. Next time Mr Glew tells everyone he won, please feel free to show him this…”

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UPDATE: June 2019

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Chapter (7) Rodney Culleton 

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Senator Rod Culleton’s inaugural question in parliament

Senator Rod Culleton had by chance uncovered an inconsistency between the High Court rules and section 33 of the High Court Act 1979, and his first question in the Senate was regarding this inconsistency. He claimed it to be a “constitutional matter” but was corrected by the Attorney General that it wasn’t.

He had been quoted as saying prior to the inaugural question:

“Under Section 33 of the constitution, writs need to be named in the name of the Queen and that clearly hasn’t been happening.”

Interesting that s. 33 of the Constitution refers to writs, but not ones from the High Court:

“Whenever a vacancy happens in the House of Representatives, the Speaker shall issue his writ for the election of a new member, or if there is no Speaker or if he is absent from the Commonwealth the Governor-General in Council may issue the writ.” 5

This doesn’t include any requirement that process should be in the name of the Queen.It is likely that Senator Culleton was actually referring to s. 33, not of the Constitution, but s. 33 of the High Court of Australia Act 1979.

All writs, commissions and process issued from the High Court shall be: (a) in the name of the Queen; (b) under the seal of the Court…; and (c) signed by… the Chief Executive and Principal Registrar…” 6

While there was no mention of the Queen in the current High Court Rules 2004, in comparison, the previous High Court Rules 1952 provided that writs of summons, subpoenas and habeas corpus applications contain the words:

“Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God Queen of Australia and Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth.” 7

Senator Brandis corrected Rod Culleton in the chamber that this matter was not a constitutional issue, but a “minor procedural error”.

Senator CULLETON: “Thank you, Mr President. One question for Senator the Hon. George Brandis QC Attorney-General and Leader of the Government in the Senate. Since Senate school, it has come to my attention that there is a discrepancy between section 33 of the High Court Act 1979—which states that all process shall, which means must, be issued in the name of the Queen—and the High Court Rules 2004. If this appears to be the case, why has the High Court felt free to defy the parliament for 12 years?”

Senator BRANDIS: “Thank you, Senator Culleton. Congratulations on your inaugural question in this chamber. I must confess, Senator Culleton, I was not expecting to be asked about the High Court rules, an object of some fascination to me, I might say. I will have a look at section 33 of the High Court Act and whether or not it is apparent that there is an inconsistency, as you say, between section 33 of the act and the rules made under the High Court Act.

As you would be aware, Senator Culleton, the rules of the court are procedural rules. They attach forms, usually, that are used in the process of the court and the various procedural steps in proceedings before the court. I must confess it has never been drawn to my attention before that there may be an issue about the consistency between the High Court rules and section 33 of the act, but, as I say, I will look at the matter.”

Additional Answers:

An exposure draft of the High Court Rules 2004 was circulated in April 2004. The exposure draft was the subject of detailed comments by the Law Council of Australia, the Australian Bar Association and the Special Committee of Solicitors-General. After considering those comments, the Justices made the High Court Rules 2004 on 5 October 2004. They were tabled in the Parliament on 16 November 2004 and came into effect on 1 January 2005.

No issue was raised in the process of drafting or consultation concerning the consistency of the Rules with s 33 of the High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth).

The Rules Committee of the High Court considered that issue on 12 October 2016. The Committee proposes a number of amendments to the Rules to address the issue. The proposed amendments will be drafted by the Office of Parliamentary Counsel and will be the subject of consultation with professional bodies before being finalised by the Court.” 8

Rod Culleton found ineligible to sit in Parliament 

Rod Culleton was found ineligible to sit as a Senator by the High Court, pursuant to Section 44 of the Commonwealth Constitution after the following factors… 9 

A Conviction of an Indictable Offence

Section 44 of the Commonwealth Constitution states that any person who: 

(ii) “…has been convicted and is under sentence, or subject to be sentenced, for any offence punishable under the law of the Commonwealth or of a State by imprisonment for one year or longer… shall be incapable of being chosen or of sitting as a senator or a member of the House of Representatives.”

On 11 April 2014, at his property in Guyra, NSW, Culleton confronted a tow truck driver who had come to repossess a truck. Initially Culleton removed the ignition key from the tow truck. In the ensuing scuffle the key was lost: the tow truck driver said Culleton had stolen it, and Culleton was charged with larceny. The charge was listed for hearing in the Armidale Local Court on the morning of 2 March. But a somewhat similar charge in Western Australia, also involving alleged interference with the movement of a receiver’s vehicle, was due to be heard on the previous day. Claiming that this made it impossible to attend the hearing in Armidale, Culleton telephoned the Armidale courthouse and offered to give evidence by telephone. But the offer was rejected. Culleton was convicted in his absence and a warrant was immediately issued for his arrest. Culleton appealed against the conviction, and throughout the ensuing election period that appeal was pending. But he made no attempt to respond to the warrant until after he was elected. The declaration of the poll took place on Tuesday 2 August.

On the following Monday, 8 August, Culleton presented himself at the Armidale courthouse and the warrant was executed. Later that day the magistrate, Mr Michael Holmes, annulled the conviction to clear the decks so that the original charge could finally proceed to trial. At a final hearing on 25 October, Culleton pleaded guilty. He was ordered to pay compensation of $322.85 for the theft of the key, but otherwise the charge was dismissed without proceeding to a conviction.

Culleton appears to have thought that his actions after the election were sufficient to dispose of any constitutional problem. Yet the fact remained that, throughout the election period, he remained subject to the conviction imposed on 2 March. Almost immediately after the election, the question arose whether this meant that he was ‘incapable of being chosen’ by virtue of s 44(ii) of the Constitution, which ascribes such incapacity to any person who:

“…has been convicted and is under sentence, or subject to be sentenced, for any offence punishable under the law of the Commonwealth or of a State by imprisonment for one year or longer.”

On the morning of Friday 3 February, a High Court bench of five judges unanimously confirmed in Re Culleton [No 2] [2017] HCA 4 that, by virtue of s 44(ii) of the Constitution, Culleton had never been validly elected to the Senate, since throughout the election period he was ‘incapable of being chosen’. 9a Four members of the Court gave a joint judgment; in a separate judgment Nettle J concurred. Culleton had argued that the annulment on 8 August had solved the problem. But that would only have been the case if the annulment was fully retrospective, wiping out the legal effect of the conviction as if it had never happened.

Bankruptcy proceedings

Section 44 of the Commonwealth Constitution states that any person who: 

(iii) “…is an undischarged bankrupt or insolvent… shall be incapable of being chosen or of sitting as a senator or a member of the House of Representatives.”

Although the sequestration order was made on 23 December in Balwyn Nominees Pty Ltd v Culleton [2016] FCA 1578 9b it determined that Culleton had been bankrupt (and therefore incapable of sitting) since 30 August 2016 – ironically, the very day when he first took his seat in the Senate.

The underlying debt dated from 24 October 2013, when Culleton and his wife Joanna were ordered in Dakin Farms Pty Ltd -v- Elite Grains Pty Lld [No 2] [2013] WADC 160 9c to pay damages of $205,536.50 (plus interest) for repudiation of a leasing agreement. In the intervening years Mrs Culleton had twice appealed unsuccessfully to the Western Australian Court of Appeal. In a final application for injunctive relief against further action on the bankruptcy notice, heard on 5 October 2016, in Culleton [2016] FCA 1193 9d Culleton relied primarily on the claim that, since 2005, no courts in Western Australia have been constitutionally valid, since their judges are no longer required to swear allegiance to the Crown. That argument, reflecting a misconception now apparently widespread in that State, appears to be based on the Acts Amendment and Repeal (Courts and Legal Practice) Act 2003 (WA), 9e which deleted references to the Crown and the Queen from a number of relevant statutes.

Although Culleton had lodged an appeal against the sequestration order made in October 2014, he failed to comply with directions for the lodgment of documents, and failed to turn up at the hearing. On 9 March 2015 his appeal was dismissed in Culleton v Macquarie Leasing Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 188 9f Yet nine months later, on 4 December 2015, that order of 9 March 2015 was itself set aside. In lieu of that order the original appeal was allowed; the orders made in October 2014 were also set aside; and the creditor’s petition was dismissed. Culleton had been allowed to present new grounds of appeal; the creditors had conceded that the new grounds were arguable, and had therefore agreed to bring the case to an end without proceeding to a hearing on whether the new grounds were established. What the new grounds were is not known: the judgment in Culleton v Macquarie Leasing Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 1478 9g issued on 21 December 2015, recording the orders made by consent on 4 December, dealt only with the question of costs.

The final chapter in this protracted saga was the judgment of a Full Bench of the Federal Court unanimously dismissed in Culleton v Balwyn Nominees Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 8 9h his final appeal against a sequestration order which, by virtue of s 44(iii) of the Constitution, had rendered him incapable of sitting in the Senate. As on the constitutional issue, his final arguments were unavailing. The hearing before the primary judge (Barker J) had originally been scheduled for 8 December, but had been adjourned to 19 December because on 7 December Culleton was in Canberra for the hearing of the High Court case. On 19 December Barker J had refused a further adjournment, and Culleton complained that this was unfair.

He also claimed that he had adduced material which should have been sufficient to negate any finding of insolvency; and in any event that the entire proceedings were an abuse of process – in part because the creditor company was said to be exploiting the judgment debt as a way of pressuring Culleton to yield to an unrelated claim concerning intellectual property, and in part on the ground ‘that the ANZ Bank and the creditor were somehow working together to bankrupt him to stifle his work in Parliament investigating the banks’. There was also an argument that under s 30(3) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), 9i Culleton should have been allowed a trial by jury. Finally, there were said to be technical defects in the proof of service of the bankruptcy notice (effected in Armidale when Culleton arrived there on 8 August to submit to the warrant relating to the theft of the key), and also in the proof of service of the creditor’s petition (by email in October 2016). Most of these issues had not been raised at any earlier hearing, and the Full Court rejected all of them.

Culleton’s vaunted litigious strategies had finally failed. The Full Court summarised his various arguments (‘without intended personal disrespect’) in scathing terms:

“The submissions barely touched the issues to be considered on the application, at least directly. They reveal a degree of unfocused and erratic content expressed with not a little assertiveness that deflected attention from whatever might have been his real defences.”

“All aboard the Culleton reality trip, the contrabulous phantasmagorica of Senator Rod Culleton.” 

Rod Culleton puts the High Court on notice 10 led by a number of different vexatious litigants claiming that 50 years of Australian laws are invalid, 11 due to the oaths being sworn to the state of Western Australia instead of the Queen, and a quite a few other previously-rejected constitutional arguments, 12 and demanded a jury trial in a bankruptcy proceeding. The UNIDROIT argument, the Coronary Oaths argument, the Biblical argument, and more in the transcripts.

This is an analysis of Rod Culleton’s submissions to the High Court, 13 

A vexatious litigant disrupts the hearing. 14

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Extract from Culleton [2016] FCA 1193:

“Mr Culleton then makes the point that the executive government of the Commonwealth ‘adopted the UNIDROIT Treaty with Rome’ in 1973. (I will take this as a reference to the Convention providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will. Opened for signature 26 October 1973. Which e ntered into force for Australia on 10 March 2015.) In reliance on that ‘Treaty’, he refers to the allegiance to the United Nations, and says that by taking the oath of allegiance, every judge is likewise bound, as is the Queen, by the ‘Holy Gospels’. He also says that, by reference to s 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), the words of the Holy Bible must be taken into consideration in finding the true meaning of a provision of an Act.

One example of a biblical passage that Mr Culleton says is relevant is from ‘the King James version of the Holy Bible bearing the royal seal of [the Queen] … in the chapter of Matthew 7, verse 1’, which reads ‘Judge not that thou shalt not be judged.’

Then, coming to the crux of the matter, Mr Culleton says that: “Judges in the courts in Western Australia have not since 2005 been taking an Oath of Allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second and as such their judgments, sentences of imprisonment, possession orders in favour of mortgagees, and allegations of contempt of court are at least voidable, if not void.”

Extract from Balwyn Nominees Pty Ltd v Culleton [2016] FCA1578:

The Judicial Oaths argument… “All previous attempts to raise this issue have equally been rejected as without any legal merit. See Shaw v Jim McGinty in his capacity as Attorney General & Anor [2006] WASCA 231 upholding Shaw v Attorney General for the State of Western Australia & Anor [2005] WASC 149; Glew & Anor v Shire of Greenough [2006] WASCA 260; Glew v The Governor of Western Australia (2009) 222 FLR 416; [2009]  WASC 14. In Glew v Shire of Greenough, Wheeler JA (with whom Pullin and Buss JJA agreed) observed, at [17] and [18], that 2003 State legislation bringing about the change in terminology did not effect any change to constitutional reality. It did not attempt to alter the relationship between the Crown and the various bodies contained within the Acts amended. Her Honour said: “There is no constitutional prohibition upon the alteration of the terminology which refers to the Crown or to her Majesty. Further, the changes of terminology contained within the Acts Amendment and Repeal (Courts and Legal Practice) Act 2003 are consistent with constitutional reality.”.

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Rod Culleton, who was still referring to himself as “Senator” (and using his official letterheads and email etc, despite the added “Gone Fishin” in the title) had to be told by Senate President Stephen Parry to bite the bullet, deal with his loss in the courts, and stop impersonating a Commonwealth Officer.

 

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“I’m going to miss the man, he has painted a vision of a libertarian Australia where our laws and indeed our entire legal system can be casually brushed off with a badly spelt submission.”

All in a quorum

Re Culleton [2018] HCATrans 138. 15 decision made in Re Culleton [2018] HCA 33: 15a

Applicant alleges Senate was inquorate when Senate resolved to refer applicant to Court of Disputed Returns.

“On 4 July 2018 Mr Culleton filed a summons in this Court in which he seeks declarations and orders including that the reference was invalid and that the orders of the Court be set aside. Mr Culleton’s contentions are that the Senate was not quorate on 7 November 2016 when the resolution was put and as a result this Court had no jurisdiction with respect to his matter. He seeks in effect to reopen the matter which has been determined by the Court and which is the subject of perfected orders. If he is able to do so he will seek to put on evidence of the fact that there was no quorum as required by s 22 of the Constitution.

It was conceded on the hearing of this summons that Mr Culleton and his legal advisors were at all relevant times aware of the fact they now allege, namely that the Senate was inquorate. In these circumstances it is not obvious why the jurisidictional argument now sought to be put was not put to the Court on the hearing of the reference.

The inference that it was then considered to be an available argument which would have been pursued but for the terms of the ruling on the application for adjournment cannot be drawn. Counsel for Mr Culleton conceded that no evidence had been placed before the Court at that time on the question whether the Senate was quorate. There was therefore no evidentiary basis for such an argument.

Further, the jurisdictional argument now sought to be raised differs from that on which the Court ruled. This argument is said not to be subject to the prohibition in s 16(3) of the Parliamentary Privileges Act for reasons which did not apply to the question ruled upon. In relation to the argument now in question it is said that all that is relied upon is the mere fact that the Senate was not quorate, as the Constitution requires it to be.”

A “quorum” is the minimum number of senators. Section 22 – Quorum: 16

“Until the Parliament otherwise provides, the presence of at least one-third of the whole number of the senators shall be necessary to constitute a meeting of the Senate for the exercise of its powers.”

A similar provision exists for the House of Representatives, in section 39 of the Constitution. Section 39 – Quorum 17

“Until the Parliament otherwise provides, the presence of at least one-third of the whole number of the members of the House of Representatives shall be necessary to constitute a meeting of the House for the exercise of its powers.”

In the House of Representatives, the quorum was amended down to one-fifth by the House of Representatives (Quorum) Act 1989. This means the quorum of the current House of 150 MPs is 30 MPs. 18

Guide to Procedures: 19

In the senate, the quorum was amended down to one-quarter by the Senate (Quorum) Act 1991 So 19 senators is a quorum. The quorum includes the occupant of the Chair and is not reduced by the death or resignation of a member or senator. 20

Chapter 8, Orders, Australian Senate Practice Eleventh Edition: 21

If at the beginning of a sitting the quorum is not met, the bells are rung for five minutes and a count is then taken; if the quorum is still not met the sitting is adjourned until the next sitting day. During the sitting, any MP or senator may draw attention to the lack of quorum in which the bells are rung for four minutes, and if a quorum is still not met the sitting is adjourned.

Although quorum-busting is virtually unheard of in Australia, it is not unknown for parties to deliberately use quorum counts as a disruptive tactic and there have been some suggestions to enact rules to restrict this practice; however, this is very difficult due to the explicit mention of a quorum in the constitution. It is considered disorderly to call attention to quorum when one exists and members or senators who do so can be punished.

To those who were supporting Rodney Culleton in his planned trip to England to speak to the House of Lords, I hope you didn’t donate too much money to pay for his plane ticket. As a bankrupt, Rod Culleton is not permitted to leave Australia without the consent of his trustee, and just booking a fight could land him in jail for 3 years under section 272 subsection 1(c) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966. 26

“A person who after he or she has become a bankrupt and before he or she is discharged from the bankruptcy, without the consent in writing of the trustee of his or her estate, leaves Australia, or does an act preparatory to leaving Australia; commits an offence and is punishable, on conviction, by imprisonment for a period not exceeding 3 years.”

Any such consent to travel would never be approved, especially because he’s up on charges for refusing to provide information under section 267B of the Bankruptcy Act 1966. 27

Chapter (14) The Great Australia Party (GAP) 

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Rod Culleton and Wayne Glew teamed up as candidates for the right-wing “Great Australia Party” (GAP) in the 2019 Federal Election. Based in an ideology of constitutional conspiracy and popularism, they ran on the platform that they were going to “restore the Commonwealth”. 29

The Party

The Great Australia Party (GAP) was formally registered by the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) on 7 April 2019, initiated by former senator Rod Culleton, to stand candidates for the Senate at the 2019 Australian federal election. Rod Culleton had previously been elected in the 2016 Australian federal election as a senator for Western Australia, but subsequently found to have been ineligible and was disqualified. 2

The party fielded two Senate candidates in New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia. Policies of the party include the removal of personal income tax, nationalization of the Commonwealth Bank and abolishment of the Family Court of Australia.3 The Party also proposes to implement trials by jury only in criminal matters, naming of young criminals who are serial offenders and the restoration of the “true” Constitution of Australia. 4 The Party further proposes a policy that criminal offenders would have sale of their property used as a possible deterrent.

The Candidates 

Party Leader Rod Culleton has on numerous occasions declared the Australian legal system is invalid and thus so are Australian Courts, 6 refusing to co-operate on numerous occasions by refusing to hand over documents or attend public examinations. Creditors were advised there was no prospect of recovering any of their money. 7 Culleton continued to refer to himself as a “senator-in-exile” and sought to appeal his disqualification to the Privy Council of the United Kingdom. 8

What Rod Culleton understood as the current “unconstitutional” issues, and the path forward in the “restoration of the Commonwealth” were outlined in Rod Culleton’s Prayer to the UK House of Lords 7 November 2018 (PDF 6 pages) see also Rod Culleton’s letter to Queen Elizabeth II 18 January 2019 (PDF 4 pages)

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On 24 April 2019, the AEC referred Culleton’s Senate nomination form to the Australian Federal Police “to examine if a false declaration has been made under provisions of the Criminal Code Act 1995, relating to his status as an undischarged bankrupt and the prima facie disqualification of such persons to be chosen or to sit as a Senator or Member of the House of Representatives under section 44(iii) of the Constitution”. 9 The AEC stated that, while it did not have power to reject a fully completed nomination form or to make its own assessment of a candidate’s eligibility, it had been aware from a High Court judgment that Culleton had been a declared bankrupt and, upon checking the National Personal Insolvency Index, had found that he was currently listed as an undischarged bankrupt. 10 

On 2 May 2019, the AEC confirmed that Culleton’s Party controversially may be eligible for public funding just for appearing on the ballot paper. This is despite a bankrupt being “incapable of being chosen” as a member of parliament, pursuant to section 44 of the Constitution. 2 The AEC also stated they did not have the power to decide if a candidate is ineligible. 11 

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The Party’s other Senate candidate in Western Australia is Wayne Glew, a former police officer who is a “self-proclaimed expert of the constitution”. Glew has been a claimant, defendant or appellant in at least 16 Court proceedings in which he has argued against the validity of the Australian legal system. Glew has not been successful in a single proceeding to date. This resulted in Glew being declared a vexatious litigant by the Supreme Court of Western Australia and being prevented from initiating any further Court proceedings in Western Australia.

On 23 December 2011 Glew was convicted in the Geraldton Magistrates’ Court of one offence of assaulting a public officer and one offence of obstructing an officer in the execution of his duty. 12 Glew provided legal advice to Heather Glendinning, who later killed herself and her two daughters in a murder–suicide in 2011. He subsequently told The West Australian that she had been murdered, and that “I spent 17 years in the police and you can make anything look like anything”. 13 In 2012, Glew was ordered to pay $2 million in damages to an investor in his fuel vaporiser system. The Supreme Court found that his invention “offered no benefit over existing fuel systems” and that he had engaged in “deceptive and misleading conduct”. 14

The Campaign Trail

Jean Bruce, 70, snapped this photo of the man who scared her outside a Cockburn polling booth.
Jean Bruce, 70, snapped this photo of the man who scared her outside a Cockburn polling booth.

On 8 May 2019 a group of intoxicated Great Australian Party supporters campaigning outside a polling booth in Cockburn, WA verbally abused a 70 year old woman and her husband.

One of the group of approximately eight Great Australian Party supporters, wearing a high-visibility vest displaying a Great Australian Party logo, was observed being drunk and aggressive and taunting voters to fight him.

Police were required to attend to intervene. In a later statement Culleton denied the supporters were registered with the Party.

This contradicts the reported statements of bystanders, voters and members of other parties who had observed Great Australian Party supporters spruiking AEC approved materials and wearing high-visibility vests displaying Great Australian Party logos. 15

2019 Election Results

As of 20 May 2019 with 53% of votes counted, the ABC News states that the Great Australia Party will not gain a seat in parliament16 with the party’s first preference vote in the senate ranging from 1.07% (6,971 votes) in South Australia to 0.14% (2,281 votes) in Victoria, while in Culleton’s home state of Western Australia they have received 0.21% (1,789 votes), 17 less than one percent of the votes required for election.

Chapter (31) Appealing to the UK Privy Council

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There’s a viral rumor infecting the internet that Rod Culleton has been reinstated as a senator because of alleged advice received from the UK Supreme Court in London, and that there is now an ongoing matter before the UK Privy Council.

 

The rumor seems to have originated on the dodgy Cairns News website 1 that also contains many other constitutional errors and OPCA myths, but has also been published by CIR website. Apparently Rod Culleton was advised by the UK Supreme Court that his senate expulsion by the High Court in 2017, was “wrong at law” citing section 47 of the Commonwealth Constitution which states:

“Disputed elections – Until the Parliament otherwise provides, any question respecting the qualification of a senator or of a member of the House of Representatives, or respecting a vacancy in either House of the Parliament, and any question of a disputed election to either House, shall be determined by the House in which the question arises.” 3

It is alleged that the case manager in the UK Supreme Court referred the team to a legal maxim cited in Hilary Term [2014] UKSC 3, from William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, which says

“…that whatever matter arises concerning either House of Parliament, ought to be examined, discussed, and adjudged in that house to which it relates, and not elsewhere.” 4

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Rod Culleton allegedly served these papers on the Senate 

Rod Culleton’s Prayer to the UK House of Lords 7 November 2018 (PDF 6 pages) see also Rod Culleton’s letter to Queen Elizabeth II 18 January 2019 (PDF 4 pages) 

POINT ONE:

For a start, let’s look at the ability for the Privy Council to hear an Australian case and if there is in fact an avenue for appeal.

The High Court website states:

Appeals to the Privy Council from decisions of the High Court were effectively ended by the combined effects of the Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act 1968 and the Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act 1975. However, a right of appeal to the Privy Council remained from State courts, in matters governed by State law, until the passage of the Australia Acts, both State and Federal, in the 1980s.” 5

In 1986 the Australia Act was introduced in all of the States, the Federal Parliament and in UK Parliament. The Australian States and the Commonwealth confirmed their sovereign, independent status from Britain. Section 11 states:

“…no appeal to Her Majesty in Council lies or shall be brought, whether by leave or special leave of any court or of Her Majesty in Council or otherwise, and whether by virtue of any Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, the Royal Prerogative or otherwise, from or in respect of any decision of an Australian court.” 6

Until this time it remained theoretically possible for some appeals to be taken under Section 74 of the Constitution, which states:

“Appeal to Queen in Council – No appeal shall be permitted to the Queen in Council from a decision of the High Court upon any question, howsoever arising, as to the limits inter se of the Constitutional powers of the Commonwealth and those of any State or States, or as to the limits inter se of the Constitutional powers of any two or more States, unless the High Court shall certify that the question is one which ought to be determined by Her Majesty in Council. The High Court may so certify if satisfied that for any special reason the certificate should be granted, and thereupon an appeal shall lie to Her Majesty in Council on the question without further leave. Except as provided in this section, this Constitution shall not impair any right which the Queen may be pleased to exercise by virtue of Her Royal prerogative to grant special leave of appeal from the High Court to Her Majesty in Council. The Parliament may make laws limiting the matters in which such leave may be asked, but proposed laws containing any such limitation shall be reserved by the Governor-General for Her Majesty’s pleasure.” 7

So to be clear, until 1986 appeals were theoretically possible for section 74 inter se cases. This means it has to be a case that involves a dispute between the federal Government and one or more of the States, and in order for any such appeal to happen the High Court would need to provide a certificate.

With Rod Culleton’s matter however, the High Court was sitting as the Court of Disputed Returns regarding his being disqualified from the Senate, which is not an inter se matter, so there isn’t an option for appeal to the Privy Council under section 74, simply because the Court was sitting as the Court of Disputed Returns.

So to summarize, the legislation created in 1968 and 1975, the pledge from the High Court in Kirmani v Captain Cook Cruises Pty. Ltd [No. 2] (1985) 159 CLR 461 that they will not write certificates, and finally the Australia Acts in 1986, closed all avenues for Privy Council appeals.

POINT TWO:

Secondly, section 47 of the Commonwealth Constitution clearly states in the start of the section:

“Until the Parliament otherwise provides…”

This is a phrase which also appears in many other sections of the Constitution, allowing the Parliament to legislate on the particular matter.

The section specifically empowers the Parliament to provide that questions of members’ qualifications, of vacancies in either house and of disputed elections may be determined “otherwise” than by the house in which they have arisen, which was the position inherited from the UK Parliament.

In 1902 the Parliament provided that the High Court would be the federal Court of Disputed Returns, in Part XVI of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1902. This jurisdiction is now provided in Part XXII of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. 8

It’s also important to note the Court of Disputed Returns does not have an avenue for appeal, either to the High Court or the Privy Council. Section 368 of the Electoral Act states:

“All decisions of the Court shall be final and conclusive and without appeal, and shall not be questioned in any way.” 9

So to summarize, the High Court sitting as the Court of Disputed Returns is completely lawful, regardless of the UK maxim Rod Culleton is implying reinstates him as senator.

So ultimately, there is no court anywhere on planet earth for Rod Culleton to appeal to.

This leaves me with a few final questions. Are in fact the writers of the aforementioned blogs off the planet?

The UK House of Lords

A similar rumour circulates around the UK House of Lords, and implies that they have some sort of jurisdiction over any situation in Australia. Rod Culleton had also recently sought their assistance in remedying his unfounded fears of a constitutional crisis.

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Introduction to Rod Culleton’s Prayer to the UK House of Lords 7 November 2018 (PDF 6 pages) see also Rod Culleton’s letter to Queen Elizabeth II 18 January 2019 (PDF 4 pages)

For those who are unaware, the UK House of Lords is the Upper House of the UK government system, and the Lower House is the UK Parliament. We have an identical system here in Australia based on the Westminster design. Here in Australia, the Upper House of the Commonwealth is the Senate, and the Lower House is the Commonwealth Parliament. Here is a good comparison of the House of Lords and the Australian Senate10

There are no appeals to the Upper House of a government of a foreign nation.

Even prior to the passing of the Australia Act 1986, in his 1977 State of the Judicature address, Sir Garfield Barwick announced that the High Court did not regard itself as bound by decisions of the House of Lords and in future would not regard itself as bound by decisions of the Privy Council. “The State of the Australian Judicature”, (1977) 51 ALJ 480 (at 485)  11

In Viro v. R. (1978) 18 A.L.R. 257 (at 282-283)  12 Gibbs J., commenting that although the High Court no longer regarded itself as bound by decisions of the House of Lords it nevertheless continued to recognise “‘their peculiarly high persuasive value’ “, suggested:

“We ought now to regard a decision of the Privy Council as even more highly persuasive [than those of the House of Lords], if that is possible, by reason of the very fact that its decisions remain binding on the States.”

Then came the Australia Act 1986, which abolished all State ties, as previously State courts could bypass the High Court in appeals and go straight to the Privy Council. As Gleeson J. points out in his speech regarding the Privy Council 13 the former restrictions on legislative powers of Parliaments of States were terminated, as section 3. subsection (2) states:

“No law and no provision of any law made after the commencement of this Act by the Parliament of a State shall be void or inoperative on the ground that it is repugnant to the law of England, or to the provisions of any existing or future Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, or to any order, rule or regulation made under any such Act, and the powers of the Parliament of a State shall include the power to repeal or amend any such Act, order, rule or regulation in so far as it is part of the law of the State.”  14

The responsibility of the United Kingdom Government in relation to State matters was terminated by section 10, which states:

“After the commencement of this Act Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom shall have no responsibility for the government of any State.” 15

Extract from Sue v Hill [1999] HCA 30 – 23 June 1999 – S179/1998 and B49/1998:

95. Almost a century has passed since the enactment of the Constitution Act in the last year of the reign of Queen Victoria. In 1922, the Lord Chancellor observed that doctrines respecting the Crown often represented the results of a constitutional struggle in past centuries, rather than statements of a legal doctrine. The state of affairs identified in Section III of these reasons is to the contrary.

It is, as Gibbs J put it, “the result of an orderly development – not … the result of a revolution”. Further, the development culminating in the enactment of the Australia Act (the operation of which commenced on 3 March 1986) has followed paths understood by constitutional scholars writing at the time of the establishment of the Commonwealth.

96. The point of immediate significance is that the circumstance that the same monarch exercises regal functions under the constitutional arrangements in the United Kingdom and Australia does not deny the proposition that the United Kingdom is a foreign power within the meaning of s 44(i) of the Constitution. Australia and the United Kingdom have their own laws as to nationality so that their citizens owe different allegiances.

The United Kingdom has a distinct legal personality and its exercises of sovereignty, for example in entering military alliances, participating in armed conflicts and acceding to treaties such as the Treaty of Rome, themselves have no legal consequences for this country.

Nor, as we have sought to demonstrate in Section III, does the United Kingdom exercise any function with respect to the governmental structures of the Commonwealth or the States. 16

 

 

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Seeing the team off to the UK. Perth Airport, 10 January 2019 (from left) Peter Alexander Gargan, Deno Budimir, Rodney Culleton and Darryl O’bryan

Peter Gargan (pictured on left) was also declared a vexatious litigant in Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Gargan (No 2) [2009] FCA 398and Chapter (7) Gargan v Director of Public Prosecutions and anor [2004] NSWSC 10 provides a good example of his similar constitutional theories.

The UK are obliged to their own legislation

It is also overlooked that the UK are obliged to their own legislation. Firstly, we can look at the Statute of Westminster 1931, adopted in Australia in 1942. Section 2 states:

“No law and no provision of any law made after the commencement of this Act by the Parliament of a Dominion shall be void or inoperative on the ground that it is repugnant to the law of England, or to the provisions of any existing or future Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom, or to any order, rule or regulation made under any such Act, and the powers of the Parliament of a Dominion shall include the power to repeal or amend any such Act, order, rule or regulation in so far as the same is part of the law of the Dominion.”

The Australia Act 1986 (UK) is also a UK Act, not an Australian Act, passed by the UK Parliament, not the Commonwealth Parliament. Section 11 of the UK version, just like the Australian version, also states:

Termination of appeals to Her Majesty in Council: “..no appeal to Her Majesty in Council lies or shall be brought, whether by leave or special leave of any court or of Her Majesty in Council or otherwise, and whether by virtue of any Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, the Royal Prerogative or otherwise, from or in respect of any decision of an Australian court.”  17

The responsibility of the United Kingdom Government in relation to State matters was likewise terminated by section 10, of the UK version, which states:

“After the commencement of this Act Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom shall have no responsibility for the government of any State.” 18

Barrister David Fitzgibbon likewise attempted to take a matter to the British High Court in 2004The case was dismissed by High Court judge Justice Gavin Lightman, who noted that not only did he have no say over the case, but even if he did rule in favour of Mr Fitzgibbon the Australian Government, independent since 1901, could ignore him completely. 19

“It is for the Australian courts to apply Australian law to determine the capacity in which Her Majesty the Queen is acting, the appropriate seal and the consequences, if any, if the wrong seal is used. It is not for the UK courts to enter the field, proffering their view as the to the proper interpretation of the Constitution.” Calling Mr Fitzgibbon’s action “quite purposeless”, the Chancery Division’s Master Bencher Bowman said: “The claim should be struck out on the basis of hopelessness … and, where appropriate, embarrassment.”

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The letter above from Buckingham Palace is Her Majesty’s latest response, to a question that has been asked many times.

The following PDF is a 2013 response from the Palace answered nearly identically. Letter-FromBuckinghamPalace-MattersToBeDirectedToGG-10May2013 

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And the response to reinstate Gough Whitlam as Prime Minister in 1975 was even more explicit.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Some of the various Constitutional Misconceptions held by Wayne Glew, Rod Culleton and many of their followers:

From Section One – The Making of a Mind Virus Chapter (5) Judicial Perspectives – Vexatious proceedings and frivolous pleas From Section Two: Indica of OPCA Strategies Chapter (8) The Supremacy of Parliament Chapter (35) Australia is NOT a foreign corporation registered with the U.S. S.E.C.    From Section Three: Constitutional Misconceptions Chapter (1) Magna Carta and Bill of Rights Chapter (2) Trial by Jury Chapter (3) The Royal Style and Titles (The Divisibility of the Crown; Changes in Constitutional relations with the U.K.) Chapter (4) The Queen of Australia Chapter (5) What is “The Crown” Chapter (6) The Great Seal Australia Chapter (7) Judicial Oaths Chapter (8) The Queen didn’t Assent that (Governor General – Letters Patent – Sign Manual) Chapter (11) The Preamble to the Constitution  Chapter (12) The Australia Act 1986 Chapter (14) The Legislative Powers of States Chapter (21) Councils are unconstitutional!  Chapter (22) Commonwealth of Australia? Nah, it’s now called STRAYA Chapter (24) So what happened in 1919? Chapter (26) Humbly Relying on the Blessing of Almighty God Chapter (28) Section 116 – Religious Freedom Chapter (29) Act of Settlement 1700 (to be edited) Chapter (30) The Coronation Oath Chapter (32) For peace, order and good government Chapter (33) Commonwealth Public Official

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